I was a member of a Commission on the future of London’s roads and streets convened by the Centre for London. Our report was launched yesterday.

This was a worthwhile exercise that stimulated thought and discussion amongst the expert members. The report will contribute to the actions that will be needed to implement the plans of the Mayor’s Transport Strategy. Some of the toughest issues concern the management of demand for both road space and kerb space while maintaining traffic flow and improving the quality of place in a city growing at the rate of about 100,000 people a year .

The Mayor of London published a draft Transport Strategy in June. The consultation period has just finished. Generally, the draft is sensible in its intentions, emphasising the important aims of healthy streets and people, good public transport, and accommodating a growing population and economy.

One stated objective is to achieve 80% of all trips by walking, cycling or public transport by 2041. However, while reduction in the share of journeys by car is desirable, it would be very ambitious to achieve this aim.

Car mode share has been falling in London, from 50% of all trips (driver and passenger) in 1993 to 36% in 2015. I projected  that on existing policies it would fall to about 30% by 2040. This is happening because the capacity of the road network prevents traffic growth, and population growth therefore results in a decline of car mode share. However, a reduction to 20% car mode share of trips could be difficulty for the following reasons:

  • Walking in London has remained at 24% of all trips consistently for the past 20 years. Walking is the slowest mode, other than for very short journeys, and could therefore be difficult to increase.
  • Cycling is growing, but from a low base. However, it is difficult to get people out of cars onto bikes. Copenhagen has excellent cycling infrastructure and a strong tradition of cycle use, which comprises 30% of all trips. However, car use at 33% is not very different from London. Walking and public transport use are much lower than in London. Crowding on public transport is likely to be reduced by promoting cycling, but there may not be much impact on car use.
  • Growth of bus use will tend to be constrained by traffic congestion, and growth of rail use by crowding and the cost of investment in new routes.
  • Reducing carriageway available for cars, for instance by allocating more road space to pedestrians and to bus and cycle lanes, would tend to reduce car use, but would not reduce congestion and would be detrimental for goods deliveries.

 

 

Transport for London has refused to renew Uber’s licence as a private hire operator after expiry of its current licence on 30 September, on the grounds that Uber lacks corporate responsibility in relation to a number of issues that have potential public safety and security implications (more detail available). Uber is appealing against this decision. Thus far more than 700,000 people have signed an online petition in support of Uber.

The Mayor, Sadiq Khan, has endorsed TfL’s decision, but has recognised the popularity of Uber and has said that there is a place in London for all private hire companies that play by the rules and that he wants to help support innovative businesses in London and to create a vibrant and safe taxi and private hire market. The Mayor is consulting on his draft Transport Strategy, which has the ambition to reduce car use to 20% of all trips by 2040. One reason why car ownership and use in London is on a downward trend is that there are alternatives to the private car, Uber and the like as well as buses and trains.

3.5m Londoners use Uber via its smartphone app and more than 40,000 licensed drivers work for the company. While there have been criticisms of a number aspects of aspects of Uber’s operations, it is evident that this innovative service meets a real mobility need. Its virtues include the clear location and timing of the arriving vehicle with a named driver, the ability to rate the driver after the trip, no need to pay by cash or card, and applicability of the same app throughout London and to all cities that Uber serves. These attractions, together with relatively low fares, account for the success of Uber in competition with black cabs and local minicabs.

TfL’s refusal to renew Uber’s licence on grounds of safety and security seems at odds with the popularity of the service amongst Londoners. Uber must have a fair chance of modifying the decision on appeal to the court or in negotiation. But if not, others will seize the opportunity to step in. The drivers and their cars are there, as are the smartphones waiting to be loaded with new apps. There are other platforms in London such as Gett and mytaxi, (both for black cabs at present), and it is reported that Uber’s main competitor in the US, Lyft, is thinking about coming to London.

An important question is whether a single platform would tend to be dominant on account of economies of scale and scope – spreading the overhead costs across the greatest number of users and providing the fastest response times. Or whether stable competition between a number of providers could be achieved, as they compete for both clients and drivers by offering attractive terms to both. Lyft has been growing market share in New York at Uber’s expense. The New Economics Foundation has proposed ‘Khan’s Cars’, a mutually-owned, publicly-regulated alternative to Uber.

Another question is the sustainable level of fares for services provided by these platforms, which would need to be sufficiently high to attract drivers but low enough to be competitive with conventional taxis and minicabs. The app-based platforms such as UberPool allow customers to share journeys with other going in the same direction at lower fares – a source of competitive advantage as well as a means of increasing vehicle occupancy, which is helpful for efficient use of the road network.

For the longer term, the possibility of driverless vehicles offers scope for substantial cost reduction for robotic taxis. This could allow population of the vacant space between high capacity, low fare public transport offering stop-to-stop or station-to-station service, and low capacity, high fare taxis offering door-to-door journeys.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

The Department for Transport publishes passenger numbers for the English light rail systems, shown in the Figure. What is striking is the very different growth rates: buoyant for London’s Docklands Light Rail and Tramlink, and for the systems in Manchester and Nottingham; but relatively static elsewhere – West Midlands, Sheffield and Tyne & Wear.

Urban light rail offers speedy and reliable travel compared to cars and buses on congested roads. In a growing economy, we expect its popularity to grow, as we see in London and Manchester.

The light rail passenger number trends bear upon the general question of whether transport investment can foster economic growth, or whether it follows it. The different patterns observed tends to suggest that urban rail investment can contribute to existing economic growth but may not in itself stimuate lift-off.

There is considerable interest in, and support for diesel scrappage schemes. The challenge is to target polluting vehicles making the biggest contribution to poor air quality. In my recent blog on air quality, I said that it would be hard to devise a scrappage scheme for the more polluting diesel vehicles. On reflection, I can see a way forward.

The Mayor of London has advocated a national diesel scrappage fund. Transport for London has developed detailed proposals that involve targeting small businesses, charities, schools, low-income households and the oldest taxis, at a total cost for London of some £500m. The recent Defra/DfT Technical Report on reducing NO2 levels considers a national diesel scrappage scheme aimed at all pre-Euro 6 diesel cars and vans, and also a scheme to replace non-compliant vehicles with battery electric vehicles. The former is extremely expensive, while the latter makes very limited impact.

I propose that a scrappage scheme could be integral to the  Ultra Low Emission Zone (ULEZ) proposed for London, which would naturally target the vehicles making the greatest contribution to poor air quality.

The ULEZ will generate net revenue that could be used to fund a scrappage scheme. The targeted vehicles would be those that pay the largest cumulative charges for entry into the zone, since these make the greatest impact on air quality. The formula might be a contribution of £X00 to scrappage for every £1000 of cumulative charges – a cash-back offer. The value of X could be adjusted in the light of experience of uptake.

Owners scrapping a car or van under the scheme would need to provide evidence that the vehicle had been scrapped. To discourage replacement by a further polluting vehicle, it might be a condition of the scrappage scheme that the owner would not be allowed in future to pay the standard charge for entry of a non-compliant vehicle into the ULEZ, and would therefore incur the penalty charge should this be done.

Over time, as non-compliant vehicles are scrapped, revenue from the ULEZ would fall, as would NO2 levels. Depending on how far the latter was from the statutory limit, the scope of the zone could be extended, whether to more recent vehicles or to a wider geographic area.

I suggest that TfL considers in detail how a scrappage scheme might work as part of a the ULEZ, and what incentives might be sought from the Government to adopt such arrangements.

Bruce Schaller, an expert on urban transportation, has published an informative and insightful report on the impact in New York City of what he calls ‘Transportation Network Companies’ (TNCs) such as Uber and Lyft. Use of these providers of app-based ride services has grown rapidly, more than doubling in each of the past four years. This reflects the popularity of the services offered, which reduce anxiety, uncertainty and stress, not least by providing assurance of a vehicle in situations where hailing the traditional yellow cab may be problematic.

The contribution of the TNCs to congestion has been a matter of controversy. The present report confirms a previous study carried out by the NYC authorities which found that worsening congestion was driven primarily by increased freight movement, construction activity, pedestrian volumes and record levels of tourism, all of which put growing demands on the streets’ limited capacity. However, use of TNCs continue to grow, raising the question of their future impact on congestion.

A key question is whether TNC growth is making more efficient use of scarce street space by putting more passengers in each vehicle, as with UberPool which offers low fares for trips shared with others? Or does it add to traffic by diverting people from high capacity services such as rail and bus, for which evidence of a recent decline in ridership is suggestive? The available evidence as a whole is insufficient for a definitive answer, but the report suggests that diversion is likely to be more important, implying  that TNC’s add to congestion.

The report is concerned that TNCs are fundamentally undoing the cost incentives to use public transport. NYC taxi fares were traditionally set at about 4.5 times the subway fare to encourage the use of transit (public transport). However, as they cut fares, the TNCs are beginning the erase these disincentives to road vehicle use. These fares do not reflect the costs of time delays arising from congestion, hence there would be a case for some kind of congestion charging.

Assessment

Congestion is self-limiting in that as traffic builds up, for instance from more TNC vehicles, speeds drop, trips take longer, and some road users make alternative decisions, for instance to travel at a less busy time, or to go to a different destination, or to use the subway. So it is not to be expected that growth of TNCs would worsen congestion in already congested parts of NYC. The switch of people from the subway to TNC services would be limited for the same reason.

 

An excellent report on the impact of road investments has been commissioned by the Campaign to Protect Rural England from Lynn Sloman and colleagues. This report re-examines the outcomes of a number of Highways England road schemes, finding average increased traffic above control levels in the short run (3-7 years) of 7% and in the longer run (8-20 years) of 47%. This is clear evidence for substantial ‘induced traffic’ generated by new capacity. The CPRE study also find very limited evidence for benefits to the local economy from road investments.

These findings pose problems for the  Department for Transport’s WebTAG approach to the economic appraisal of road schemes, in which time savings to users is the dominant benefit. However, induced traffic tends to restore congestion to what it had been, lessening time savings. If induced traffic were properly taken into account, the apparent value of the investment would be substantially less. Moreover, the orthodox approach assumes unchanged land use, yet the CPRE report documents extensive land use change in four detailed case studies. Such changes have implications for local economies, not necessarily wholly advantageous if these take the form of low-wage employment in warehouses or car-dependent residential development.

Assessment

The main policy objective of the current UK national road investment programme is to boost economic growth by improving inter-urban connectivity and reducing congestion. Each scheme of the programme must offer acceptable value for money on the orthodox approach to appraisal, yet this approach overstates benefits by underestimating induced traffic and disregards changes in land use made possible by improved access. We need an evidence-based approach to investment appraisal, in which careful evaluation of completed schemes of the kind commissioned by the CPRE informs appraisal of prospective investments.

The National Infrastructure Commission (NIC) has been issuing Discussion Papers for comment. I have previously blogged about the paper on technology.

Two further NIC papers are of interest: one concerns the relation between economic growth and the demand for infrastructure, where it is assumed that these are closely correlated. In my response (Metz NIC Econ growth 28-3-17 ) I argued that, for transport, this is far from the case, with demand saturation an important phenomenon.

The other discussion paper concerned the impact of population change and demography  My response (Metz NIC population 23-1-17 ) drew attention to the importance for transport infrastructure investment of where a growing population is housed : greenfield housing leads to road investment, urban densification requires investment in public transport.

My new book, Travel Fast or Smart?, is one in a series of short books on policy and economics topics described as ‘essays on big ideas by leading writers’. My contribution is a critique of the inconsistencies of transport policy in recent decades, which I attribute to the shortcomings of conventional transport economic appraisal in identifying the benefits that arise from investment.  This book is available both in print and as an ebook from Amazon Books


Transport for London (TfL) has published an illuminating report on the topic of Land Value Capture (LVC) – the way in which transport investments could be funded from a share of the increased value of land and property that follows when access is improved as a result of the investment. This study was carried out in response to a request from the Government for detailed proposals.

The range of possible approaches to LVC is wide, and overseas experience is relevant. A conclusion is that of past projects, the Jubilee Line Extension to Docklands resulted in land value uplifts of 52% relative to controls, and the Docklands Light Railway extension to Woolwich, 23%. For eight prospective TfL projects costing around £36bn, land value uplifts could be £87bn. So plenty of value that could help fund these new investments.

The Annexes to the main report are interesting, particularly Annex 7, the literature review of the theory and practice of the relationship between transport and land value, a relationship which does not form part of the orthodox approach to cost:benefit analysis of transport investment. The orthodox approach is concerned with benefits to users, particularly time saved through faster travel. The orthodox view is that to include the uplift of the value of land made more accessible by the investment would double count benefits that accrue to users. However, the user benefits are notional, based on the outputs of transport models, whereas the land value uplifts are real and observable.

Assessment

The TfL report is important, both to identify possible ways of using LVC to fund new projects, and also to assert the relevance of land value uplift as a measure of the economic impact of transport investments. Chris Grayling, Secretary of State for Transport, in a speech on 6 December 2016, recognised the case for LVC:

I want to look at innovative ways of funding infrastructure development. Often the opening of a new road or a new railway line or station can transform the value of development land. It is right and proper that the government gets back some of the value it has created to invest in infrastructure. We have seen this happen for Crossrail through the mayoral community infrastructure levy.

My new book, Travel Fast or Smart?, is one in a series of short books on policy and economics topics described as ‘essays on big ideas by leading writers’. My contribution is a critique of the inconsistencies of transport policy in recent decades, which I attribute to the shortcomings of conventional transport economic appraisal in identifying the benefits that arise from investment.  This book is available both in print and as an ebook from Amazon Books


There is much current interest worldwide in the concept of Mobility-as-a-Service (MaaS), the aim of which is to provide seamless journeys using the most appropriate travel modes, routed and ticketed by means of a smart phone app. The MaaS provider ‘aggregates’ the services provided by transport operators (in the way that Amazon acts for retail product providers). MaaS is intended to be an attractive alternative to private car ownership. The Transport Catapult has recently published a report on the opportunities for MaaS in the UK. And the New Cities Foundation has addressed the role of public transport operators in its development.

There are many recognised technical and policy issues that need to be tackled, including managing the large amounts of data, and coordinating ticketing and payments on behalf of a multiplicity of operarors. However, there are two aspects that deserve particular consideration. The first is the ability of MaaS to cope with peak travel demand.

Peak demand

Daily travel demand is characterised by morning and evening peaks, and there are also seasonal variations. Peaks result in road congestion and crowding on railways. One approach would be to charge higher prices at times of greatest demand, with the aim of spreading the peak. This model has been adopted in the aviation sector, led by the low-cost carriers, and by Uber for urban taxis (and also in other sectors such as hotels). The railways offer off-peak discounted fares, but do not flex fares upwards to reflect actual peak demand.

However, unless peak pricing is part of the public transport provision (which at present it is not), the scope for coping with peak demand for multi-modal journeys is quite limited. This means that unreliability of travel time for each stage of a journey would present a scheduling problem.

While MaaS comprises a minority of all trips, congestion would be a given, and scheduling would need to allow for expected journey stage times plus a margin for uncertainty, with rerouting in the event of unexpected congestion. On railways, consideration would need to be given to offering alternatives to overcrowded trains. Such dynamic scheduling could be technologically challenging.

Were MaaS to grow to encompass a substantial part of travel demand, there may be scope for routing travellers to spread demand across the network in a way that optimises overall efficiency, simplest for routes that involve stages with assured reliability – rail, bus rapid transit, walking and cycling. There would also be scope to consolidate car trips by means of shared taxis, as with UberPOOL. However, such sharing, incentivised by lower fares, could attract passenger from buses, which could add to congestion.

If MaaS were to be a major intermediary in meeting travel demand, a significant operational issue would be whether to respond to peak demand for door-to-door travel by mobilising more taxis through surge pricing, as does Uber. Surge pricing to deter demand and increase supply is sensible in the absence of congestion, but may not be optimal under congested conditions. In the absence of surge pricing, demand would exceed supply and would be rationed by waiting in a virtual queue until a taxi becomes available. With surge pricing, there is a greater supply of taxis and so less waiting time, but journey times might be slower on account of increased congestion. Which approach would be optimal would require modelling.

Surge pricing works well for aviation, a closed system where an aircraft can only fly if it has airport slots allocated at trip origin and destination. But roads are an open system and hence prone to congestion at peak times in populated areas. MaaS would be more straightforward to implement in lower density areas, less so in urban centres, unless private cars were entirely replaced by a fleet of shared use self-driving vehicles, as has been suggested.

Who owns the platform?

The question of how MaaS can best cope with peak demand is linked to the second problem – the nature of the platform by means of which demand and supply are matched, prices set and revenues allocated. The central issue is familiar: benefits of competitive supply versus benefits of an integrated network. Experience is varied. In the case of buses, Mrs Thatcher’s government opened the bus services outside London to competition with minimal regulation, hoping to benefit users by on-the-road competition between private sector operators. This largely failed to materialise since such competition resulted in unattractive profit margins. In consequence, the present Government has introduced legislation that would allow other cities to adopt the successful London model, whereby an integrated public transport network is operated by a politically controlled public body, Transport for London.

For MaaS, the question is whether an open source public platform would naturally evolve on account of the superior benefits, as envisaged by the TravelSpirit collaboration. Or whether competition in the market between competing platforms would be the main driver, with perhaps a dominant platform emerging through economies of scale and scope.

A dominant private sector platform might need to be regulated to avoid market failure that allowed economic rents to be extracted at the expense of users. The MaaS provider would have access to all the data arising from use of the system. Fair sharing of this data with transport providers would help meet the needs of users. On the other hand, discriminatory sharing could increase returns to the provider.

Assessment

Traffic congestion is the main problem of the road system. A key question is whether MaaS has the potential to lessen traffic congestion. If it does, then promoting MaaS could be a sensible transport policy, in which case a view would need to be taken of the relative attractions of competing platforms versus a single public platform.

In the longer run, developments in shared use driverless urban vehicles might achieve substantial mitigation of urban traffic congestion. Sharing of taxis would increase vehicle occupancy and hence efficiency of the road system; demand management could limit use of single occupancy vehicles under congested conditions; and the development of vehicle-to-infrastructure communications could permit flow management, analogous to air traffic control. In such circumstances, MaaS would be likely to be an integral part of an urban transport management system. However, development of such a system would be challenging in respect of technology, business models, institutions and public acceptability – hence the feasibility and timing is uncertain. In the meantime, development of MaaS in urban areas would need to cope with traffic congestion.